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MICHIGAN LAW

REVIEW

CORPORATIONS-VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION - RIGHTS OF MINORITY
STOCKHOLDERS-The directors of defendant, a New Jersey corporation, in an
effort to effect corporate tax savings and simplification of operations, submitted
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the following plan to its shareholders: Defendant was to sell all of its operating
assets to X, a Pennsylvania corporation which had been formed by the directors and was to receive as consideration all of the capital stock of X. Then defendant was to be dissolved and X's stock and any corporate surplus was to be
distributed to the stockholders. The necessary two-thirds majority of the stockholders, as required by statute, 1 voted to sell the operating assets and to dissolve.
Plaintiff, a minority stockholder, sued to enjoin the sale and dissolution and
prayed a temporary injunction pending final hearing. Held, interlocutory injunction denied. Light v. National Dyeing and Printing Company, (N.J. 1947)

55 A. (2d) 233.
As a basis for his complaint plaintiff relied primarily on the New Jersey case
of Riker and Son v. United Drug Co. 2 There, under a similar fact situation,
the directors had adopted resolutions to sell all the corporate assets and to dissolve the corporation. The Court of Chancery refused to enjoin the corporation
from submitting to the stockholders for approval the resolution pertaining to
dissolution, holding that if the necessary statutory requirements are complied
with, and there is no fraud, dissolution is proper. 3 Plaintiff appealed, and the
Court of Errors and Appeals reversed that portion of the lower court's holding
which denied the injunction. 4 The higher court held that in effect the dissolution was but one link in an illegal merger. 5 Probably the plan was not technically
a merger,° and the decision can perhaps be explained on the theory that the
court added to the statutory requirements of voluntary diss.olution its own requirement of a valid business motive. Since it had not been alleged that any
fraud was being perpetrated against the minority stockholders, this is the only
rational basis for sustaining the holding. The statutory language permitting
voluntary dissolution has remained essentially the same since the Riker case was
decided.7 Therefore, the present decision of the Chancery Court appears to
follow the view of the lower court in the Riker case, in spite of the contrary
view of. the Court of Errors and Appeals, by not inquiring into the motives
1

N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §§ 14:3-5, 14:13-1.
79 N.J. Eq. 580, 82 A. 930 (1912). In this case the plan was to sell all of the
assets of the New Jersey corporation to a newly created Massachusetts corporation in
return for all of its capital stock. Then the New Jersey corporation was to be dissolved.
The reasons for this plan were to provide for additional capital and to eliminate
subsidiaries.
3
78 N.J. Eq. 319, 79 A. 1044 (1911).
4 Supra, note 2.
11
At the time of this case the New Jersey statute permitted only the merger of
N!!w Jersey corporations. N.J. Laws (1896) § 104, p. 309. Today the sort of "illegal
merger" condemned in the Riker case is now specifically authorized by statute. N.J.
Rev. Stat. (1937) § 14:12-1.
6
It was not contemplated that the New Jersey corporation would also pass its
powers, rights, duties and obligations to the Massachusetts corporation. The court in
the principal case specifically stated that the fact situation of the principal case did not
involve a merger. Although it stated that the Riker case involved a merger, it is
submitted that the court so stated, merely to deny the authority of the Riker case. See
15 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., §§ 7044 and 7045 (1938) and cases cited therein.
7
The statute in effect at the time of the Riker case was N.J. Laws ( 1896) c. 18 5,
§ 31, p. 287. The statute in effect today is N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) § 14:13-1.
2
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for dissolution unless fraud is alleged. 8 What the court would consider a fraud
upon the minority stockholders is not clear. Apparently fraud will be found if
threat of dissolution is being used for the purpose of forcing stockholders to sell
their stock at the price of the stockholder seeking dissolution. 0 But dictum in one
case supports the proposition that the statutory majority could dissolve the cor-1
poration in order to "freeze out" the minority and appropriate the business.10
This dictum must be qualified, however, by the fact that the particular corporation's main business had· been rendered unlawful by statute. In another case,
even though the corporation involved was a going concern, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, in applying West Virginia law, refused to enjoin a dissolution
instituted for the purpose of "freezing out" the minority.11 The court did
attempt to relieve the minority, however, by permitting a damage action against
the majority stockholders for breach of "trust." At least it is certain that in New
Jersey, so long as there is no attempt to oust the minority from a going corporation, business motives which induce dissolution will not be held to constitute a
fraud upon the minority. There is much to be said for this position. Continuation of a business enterprise is a matter of business judgment, and the statute
has specified that two-thirds of the stockholders shall have' a certain discretion.
The court should not interfere with -this discretion by assuming to determine
whether the judgment of the majority is sound.12

Bayard E. Heath, S.Ed.

.s It cannot be said that the business motive of ceasing to do business in New Jersey
for the purpose of reducing taxes is any more commendable than one for the purpose
of carrying on business in Massachusetts.
9 Reade v. Broadway Theatre Co., 99 N.J. Eq. 282, 132 A. 477 (1926).
10 Meyerhoff v. Bankers Securities, Inc., I05 N.J. Eq. 76, 147 A. I05 (1929).
11 Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1936) 82 F. (2d) 351, cert. den.,
316 U.S. 675, 62 S.Ct. rn45 (1942), note IO UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 77 (1942).
Contra, Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas Light Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 P. 1004 (1904).
12 Beidenkopf v. Des Moines Life Ins. Co., 160 Iowa 629, 142 N.W. 434
(1913); Bowditch v. Jackson, 76 N.H. 351, 82 A. 1014 (1912); Dammann v.
Hydraulic Clutch Co., 45 Cal. App. 5n, 187 P. 1069 (1920), disapproval of motive
not sufficient reason for court to interfere. In Beutelspacher v. Spokane Savings Bank,
164 Wash. 227, 2 P. (2d) 729 (1931), the court refused to determine whether the
action was expedient or wise. For discussions of voluntary dissolutions see: Sprecher,
"The Right of Minority Stockholders to Prevent the Dissolution of a Profitable Enterprise," 33 KY. L.J. I 50 ( I 945) ; Fain, "Limitations of the Statutory Power of Majority Stockholders to Dissolve a Corporation," 25 HARV. L. REV. 677 (1912); 2
MINN. L. REv. 526 (1918).

